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Optimal Risk Management,  Risk Aversion,  and
Production Function Properties
Edna Loehman and Carl Nelson
For production  risk  with  identified physical  causes,  the nature  of risk,  pro-
duction  characteristics,  risk preference,  and prices  determine  optimal  input
use. Here, a two-way classification for pairs of inputs-each input as being risk
increasing or decreasing and pairs as being risk substitutes or complements-
provides  sufficient  conditions  to  determine  how  risk aversion  should  affect
input use. Unlike the Sandmo price risk case in which a more risk averse firm
produces  less  output,  a  more  risk  averse  firm  may produce  more  expected
output and use more inputs  than a risk neutral firm.  Sufficient conditions to
determine  types  for pairs  of inputs are  also related to  properties of the pro-
duction function.
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Introduction
"The nature of uncertainty  in a production function is crucial to determine the effects  of
production risk on the firm's input decision ... " (Honda, p. 91). Accordingly,  this article
examines  the case  of production  risk and  risk  management  when  there  are  identified
physical causes of risk,  such as insects and weather, with known probability distributions.
The  characterization  of production  decisions  under  risk  is the  subject  of a growing
literature,  and conjectures have been made regarding how increasing risk aversion should
affect production  decisions.  Early studies considered  exogenous price risk. For example,
Sandmo  studied price risk and output decisions in the firm.  The result  obtained with  a
nonrisky cost function was that the risk averse  firm should produce less output than the
risk neutral firm.  Batra and Ullah considered input decisions in the firm with price risk.
They also found that the output of the  firm should decline with risk aversion based on
effects  on  input  use.  Although  a production  model  was  used  to  model  input  effects,
production risk was not considered in Batra and Ullah's work.
Recent research  has focused  on production  risk rather  than price  risk.  In such cases,
input use can affect the nature of risk so that risk becomes  at least in part endogenous or
manageable;  for example, insecticide use affects  insect risk (Antle; Carlson;  Feder). As in
classical production  theory,  economic  optimization  modeling can provide rules for risk
management to determine optimal input use. Here, rules are shown to be related to prices,
level of risk aversion,  the nature of inputs, and characteristics of the production process.
Previous  research in production  risk studied  special  cases.  Pope and  Kramer used  a
specific type of stochastic production function with only two inputs and a constant relative
risk aversion (power) utility function. MacMinn  and Holtman investigated  the case of a
general risk averse  utility function and a general production  function,  but with only one
input. Babcock, Chalfant, and Collender included multiple inputs; however,  the moment
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generating function method they used for optimization under risk assumes an exponential
utility function.
Comparative static results for production under risk are obtained here for more general
conditions.  Results are based  on a general stochastic production  function  with multiple
inputs, and both exponential and power utility function cases are included. In comparison
to Pope and Kramer,  who were also concerned  with the  effect of risk aversion on input
use, more  complete comparative  static results and sufficient conditions  are given.
Categorization  of pairs of inputs-each as being risk increasing or decreasing  and pairs
as being risk substitutes  and complements-is  used to delineate conditions under which
input use should increase  or decrease  with risk aversion.  For the exponential  and power
utility functions,  sufficient  conditions to identify input types  according  to the proposed
categorization  are given in terms of properties of the stochastic production  function.  In
contrast to the Sandmo price risk case, we show that the risk averse firm may even produce
more  expected  output  and use  more  inputs  than the  risk  neutral firm  when  there are
multiple inputs.
This approach  differs from  that used by Meyer and  Ormiston and by Jewitt  because
they described  risk in terms of parameterized  changes  in a distribution  function  rather
than  using a production  function  to model  risk.  The advantage  of using the production
function  approach,  as demonstrated  here,  is that  sufficient conditions  can be based  on
classical production concepts  extended to the risk case.
Another approach to study production under risk is based on approximating first order
conditions in mean-variance  terms  (see Anderson,  Dillon,  and Hardaker;  Robison and
Barry).  The approach in this article avoids approximation and instead relies heavily  on
application of a theorem in statistics called Lehmann's  Theorem (Barlow and Proschan).
Endogenous  Production Risk and Input Choice
Since input  choice  affects  the nature  of yield  risk,  risk  is  partly  endogenous.  Optimal
management of risk entails the optimal choice of inputs. Inputs are assumed to be chosen
before the state of nature is revealed.
Production risk will be described here by a stochastic production  function,
(1)  y = F(x, 0),
which  relates random  output (y)  to a vector of inputs  (x) and  the  state of nature  (0).  0
represents physical causes  of production  risk such  as weather  and insects with a known
cumulative  distribution  G(O). In contrast to Pope and Kramer, the stochastic production
function need not be the linear in 0. Specification  of this production  function should be
based on physical  relationships between  inputs and  sources of risk, rather  than being  a
model of measurement  error with heteroskedasticity  as in Just and  Pope (1978,  1979)
(see example  below).  To describe yield  risk, a distribution for yield is determined from
(1) as a transformation of G(0) given input use.  Below, only one source of risk (0)  is used.
Optimal input choice  for a risk averse  producer is assumed to satisfy maximization  of
expected utility:
(2)  Max  s  u(Wo  + pF(x,  ) - w.x)  dg(O),
x
A
where u denotes the utility function for income,  Wo is riskless income, x denotes a vector
of inputs with input price vector w, p is price of output, and A  is the support of 0. Prices
p and w are assumed here to be riskless.  Profit is defined by:
(3)  7r(x, 0) = pF(x, 0) - w.x.
A risk neutral producer would maximize expected profit rather than  (2).
The  following  lemma  gives  sufficient  conditions  to  determine  the  sign  of expected
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marginal profit (as in MacMinn and Holtman) at the optimum of (2) based on production
function  properties.  The lemma  applies for a general  production  function  and concave
utility function. Note that, in contrast to production in the certainty case with zero marginal
profit for each input,  here marginal profit may be positive or negative  depending on the
properties of the production function at optimum input use. F,, Fr, and Fx,, denote partial
derivatives  of the production function with respect to xi and 0.
Lemma 1: Given a concave  utility function,  an input (xi) gives a positive  expected
marginal profit at the optimum (x*) if Fo(x*, 0) and Fx,,(x*, 0) have the same sign for
all values of 0, and a negative expected marginal profit at the optimum if they have
opposite signs.
Proof: The expected marginal profit (ETr_,)  evaluated at optimum input use x* satisfies
the following  first order conditions for (1):
(4)  Erx  = E(pFx) - w  = -Cov(u', pFx,)/Eu'
from the definition  of covariance (MacMinn  and Holtman; Pope and Kramer).  By Leh-
mann's Theorem (see appendix B) applied with a concave utility function, the sign of the
covariance Cov(u', Fx) is positive if Fo and Fx,, have opposite signs and is negative if they
have the same signs. Then,  a negative expected marginal profit is obtained for a positive
covariance  term and,  conversely,  a positive  marginal  expected  profit is  obtained  for a
negative covariance  term. QED.
Input Classification
How  the  solution  for optimal  input  use  in  (2)  would  change  as  the Pratt-Arrow  risk
aversion coefficient changes  is a question of comparative  statics. For this purpose,  Pope
and Kramer proposed  two alternative definitions  to classify inputs:
Definition 1: An input is said to be "marginally risk reducing" if the expected marginal
profit is negative  at the optimum input use  and "marginally  risk increasing"  if the
expected marginal profit  is positive at the optimum input use.
Definition 2: An input is  said to be  marginally  risk reducing  (increasing) if the risk
averse firm uses a larger  (smaller) quantity of the input than the corresponding  risk
neutral firm.
The equivalence  of these  two definitions implies  that a more risk averse  person should
use more  of an input  having  a negative  expected  marginal  profit and  less of an input
having a positive  expected marginal  profit.  Lemma  1, above,  is sufficient  to determine
whether  inputs are marginally  risk reducing  or increasing according to Definition  1.
When the production  function has a form linear in 0,
F(L, K, 0)  = f(L, K)  + g(L, K)0, with EO = 0,
assuming a power utility function, Pope  and Kramer showed that these two  definitions
are  equivalent  if certain  sign  conditions  are  imposed  on derivatives  of the stochastic
production function F(L, K,  0) with respect to two inputs, L and K.
Below, instead of the categorization in Definition  1, pairs of inputs will be categorized
in two ways:  whether  each input is risk increasing  or decreasing  (Definition  3);  and for
the pair, whether  they are risk substitutes  or complements  (Definition 4).  This categori-
zation is more complex than that in Definition  1. However, this categorization  gives rise
to definitive comparative  static results for a general production function, as stated in the
theorem below.
Definitions below are in terms of the certainty equivalent (CE) as derived from expected
utility (Eu):
u(CE(Wo, x,  w, p)) = Eu(Wo  + ir(x,  0)).
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Definitions are given in terms of the certainty equivalent rather than in terms of expected
utility  because  then  interpretations  are  in  dollar-valued  terms  (see  below).  Note  that
maximization  of the certainty equivalent gives the same results as expected utility max-
imization.  The "marginal  certainty equivalent"  CE, denotes the partial derivative of the
certainty equivalent  with respect to an input; it is proportional to the marginal expected
utility due to input i:
aCE _E  U
CEi=  = (l/u'(CE))
axi  axi
because  utility is monotone  increasing.
The  interpretations  of the definitions  below  are  that: for a risk increasing  input, in-
creasing risk aversion will reduce the marginal certainty equivalent, whereas the marginal
certainty equivalent  for a risk reducing  input will increase with risk aversion.  For a pair
of inputs which  are  risk substitutes,  an increase  in one input  will reduce  the marginal
certainty equivalent of the other, whereas for complements, an increase in one input will
increase the marginal certainty  equivalent.
Note also  that  the  definitions  are  given  in  terms of the  optimum  solution.  The  (*)
notation  indicates  that input  use  (x*)  and  profit  (or*)  are evaluated  for input  use  held
constant at the optimum value  for  (2).  Since the optimum solution  could vary by geo-
graphic area (e.g., not the same in high and low rainfall areas), the  type of an input may
vary depending on the nature of physical risk.  The Pratt-Arrow risk aversion coefficient
for the exponential  utility function  is denoted by r.
Definition 3: An input will be termed "risk increasing"  if ci < 0 and "risk reducing"




Definition 4:  For a pair of inputs  (xi, xj),  they will be termed  "risk substitutes"  if




If qj =  0, there is "no risk substitution" between inputs  i and j.
Below, we compare risk increasing (reducing) inputs in Definition 3 to marginally risk
increasing  (reducing) inputs in Definition  1. Definition  1 can be  shown to relate to  first
order  effects  of an input  on  the risk  premium.  The  risk premium  (RP) and  certainty
equivalent (CE) are related by
RP= Efr  - CE,
where RP is a positive number for a risk averse person.  The certainty equivalent satisfies
OCE*




From this  correspondence  at  the  optimum,  a "marginally  risk increasing"  input  in
Definition 1 will have a positive marginal risk premium at the optimum; thus, increasing
input use from the optimum will increase the risk premium. A "marginally risk reducing"
input  will have a negative  marginal  risk premium;  thus,  increasing input  use  from the
optimum will reduce the risk premium.
Risk increasing  (reducing) inputs in Definition  3 are defined in terms of the certainty
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Thus, the sign of ci shows the change  in the marginal  certainty equivalent for an input as
the Pratt-Arrow risk aversion coefficient is varied. If ci < 0 (risk increasing),  an increase
in r will reduce the marginal  certainty equivalent for an input; for ci  > 0 (risk reducing),
an increase in r will increase the  marginal certainty equivalent  for an input.
Comparative Static Effects  of Risk Aversion
Here, for a general production function and both power and exponential utility functions,
the  above  categorization  of inputs  is  shown  to give  rise  to comparative  static results
specifying when a more risk  averse producer  should use more or less  of a given type  of
input  than  a  less  averse  producer.  In  contrast  to  the  Pope  and  Kramer  special  case,
comparative  static results obtained here  for general conditions  require inputs to be clas-
sified by more than just the  sign of the expected  marginal  profit at the optimum.  Also,
sufficient conditions  for categorizing  inputs are shown to be based not only on properties
of the production  function but also on relative prices.
For a pair of inputs,  in addition to the "no  substitution"  case, there  are six possible
combinations  of input types according to Definitions 3 and 4. Separately, both inputs can
be risk increasing, both can be risk reducing,  or one input can be risk increasing and the
other risk reducing.  For the pair,  they can be either risk complements  or substitutes  for
each of the three cases above.
The  comparative  statics result of this article  is stated in the theorem  below. Effects  of
risk aversion for each of the above six types plus the case of no substitution are described
in the theorem.  Second  order  conditions link  combinations of input types to  effects  of
risk aversion  (see appendix  A proving the theorem).  In comparison,  Pope  and Kramer
presented  proofs for only cases  (ii),  (v), and  (vi) of this theorem  and only for the power
utility function and production function linear in 0. This theorem extends their results in
terms of generality of the production function, allowing both exponential and power utility
functions, and completeness of the input combinations.
Theorem: The  following comparative  static results  hold for pairs  of inputs,  with a
general stochastic production  function,  for either  an exponential  or a power utility
function.
(i)  In the case of production with only one input, or no risk substitution for a pair
of inputs,  a risk increasing input should be used less intensively  by a more risk
averse person,  and a risk decreasing input should be used less intensively  by a
less risk averse person.
(ii)  For a pair of risk substitutes, when both inputs are risk increasing,  either both
should decrease with increasing  risk aversion or one  should increase while the
other decreases.
(iii)  For a pair of risk substitutes when  both inputs  are risk reducing,  either both
should increase with increasing risk aversion,  or one should increase while the
other decreases.
(iv) For a pair of risk substitutes, when one input is risk increasing and the other
is risk reducing, then use of the risk reducing input should increase and use of
the risk increasing input should decrease with increasing risk aversion.
(v)  For a pair of risk complements, when both inputs are risk increasing,  then use
of both should go down with increasing risk aversion.
(vi)  For a pair of risk complements,  when both inputs  are risk reducing, then use
of both should go up with increasing risk aversion.
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(vii)  For a pair of risk complements,  when  one  is risk increasing and  the other is
risk reducing, then the risk increasing input should not increase with increasing
risk aversion unless  the risk reducing  input  also increases.  The risk reducing
input  should  not decrease  with risk aversion  unless the risk increasing  input
also decreases.  The risk increasing input may decrease if the risk reducing input
increases.
Proof: The proof (see appendix A) identifies possible and impossible cases for input use
combinations  based on comparative static analysis  of first and  second order conditions
for optimization of (2).
These results can be compared to the results of Sandmo,  and Batra and Ullah for price
risk, assuming that expected output is nondecreasing with increasing input use. As in their
results, if there is only one input and one output and if that input is risk increasing, then
the risk averse firm will produce less expected output than the risk neutral firm. However,
here  the  more risk averse  firm  also may  produce  more  expected  output  than the  risk
neutral firm if this single input is risk reducing.
The theorem also implies that expected output will decline with increasing risk aversion
if pairs of inputs are complements and all inputs are risk increasing.  Expected output also
could decline under other conditions  (e.g.,  if pairs of inputs are risk substitutes  and  all
are risk increasing).  Conversely,  expected output will increase with risk aversion if pairs
of inputs are  risk complements  and both  are risk reducing.  Expected  output could also
increase  in  other cases  (e.g.,  if pairs  of inputs  are  risk  complements,  and  one  is  risk
increasing and one is risk reducing).
Sufficient Conditions for Identifying Risk Increasing/Decreasing  Inputs
We now give sufficient conditions related only to production function properties to identify
if an input is risk increasing or risk reducing for two commonly used utility functions-
exponential  and power utility functions.
Exponential  Function
For the exponential  function, with initial wealth  Wo
u(r) = ko  - kle-r(ir+ 
°),
the Pratt-Arrow risk aversion coefficient is a constant (r > 0). At the optimum, since the
marginal certainty  equivalent and expected marginal utility are zero at this optimum,
c=  dCEd  = -d(k,/u'(CE*))  re-r(r*+Wo)7r*  dG(O) 6r  xi  =r  ax
A
= -(k,/u'(CE*))  re-r(7r  )(ir* +  WW)  dG(O).
A
Sufficient conditions to determine the sign of the above integral are obtained from Leh-
mann's Theorem.  First, from the definition of covariance,
E(e-r(7r*+  W)( 7 r*  +  Wo)ir*)  =  E(e-r(w*+  Wo)(r*  +  Wo))E(rx*)
+  Cov(rx*,  e-r(r*+w)(r
* +  Wo)).
From Lehmann's  Theorem,  the sign of the covariance above is determined by the signs
of the derivatives  of its two arguments with respect to 0:
(i)  This covariance is positive if Fx*  and - [e- r( T*+W+(T* +- WO)] have the same sign;
xoi
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a
(ii)  this  covariance  is  negative  if F*o and  -[e-r(lr*+ wor*  +  W0)]  have  opposite
signs.
The  second term  above will  be  positive  if F6 > 0,  (Ir* +  W)  >  0,  and  [1  - r(r* +
WO)]  > 0 since:
- [e
- r(i*+wo)(r  *  +  Wo)]  = e-'r(*+Wo)r*[1  - r(r* +  Wo)]. d0
Also,  E(e  -r(r*+Wo)(r*  +  WW))  is positive if  (7.* +  WO) is positive.  The sign of E(rx*)  also
depends  on the sign  of Fxo as in Lemma  1. The  sign of ci is then  determined from  the
combination of the above conditions,  as summarized below:
Lemma 2: If (r*  +  Wo)  is positive  and Max[7r*  +  WO] < -:  xi is risk reducing  if
0
Fxi0(X*, 0) and F(x*, 0) have  opposite  signs;  xi is risk increasing  if Fx,(x*,  0) and
Fo(x*, 0) have the same sign.
Power Function
With initial wealth  WO,  the power function with relative  risk aversion s is:
U(X)  =  (WO  +  )1
' -S.
At the  optimum with expected  profit Eir*, the following Pratt-Arrow  coefficient  corre-
sponds to this power function:
s
r-
WO  +  Er*'
To determine risk increasing/risk  reducing properties,  consider the sign of
a  OCE  a  CE*  CE*s
i  r  axi - Os  x,  jar'
Os
Since  > 0,  the sign of ci is the same as the sign of
d  2E  - - ln(W  +  (W  +  T*)(  +  *)- r*  dG(O) Osaxi
A
= -[Cov(7rx,  ln(WO  +  i7*)(W  +  i*)-s)
+  E(ln(WO  +  7r*)(Wo  +  r*)-s)E(ir*)].
The same sign conditions as above are shown to determine the sign of ci from Lehmann's
Theorem-with  the requirements  that  (WO  +  ir*)  > 0 and  Max  ln(WO  +  7r*)  < I.  The
0  S
results for the power function are summarized by the following lemma.
Lemma  3:  For  the  power  utility  function  with  (WO  +  ir*)  >  0  for  all  0 and
Max[ln(WO  +  7r*)]  <  !:  x, is risk reducing if Fx,(x*, 0) and Fo(x*, 0) have opposite
0 
s
signs; x, is risk increasing if Fo(x*, 0) and Fo(x*, 0) have the same sign.
Thus,  for these  two  commonly  used  utility  functions,  for risk  aversion  coefficients
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satisfying the bound conditions, properties of the stochastic production  function are suf-
ficient to determine whether an input is risk reducing  or increasing.
Because  of the bound condition,  the magnitude of the Pratt-Arrow risk aversion coef-
ficient should be inversely related to the magnitude of income-  similar to the magnitude
restriction obtained by Raskin and Cochran but for different reasons. The bound condition
for the power function  is more restrictive  than that for the  exponential  function.  Note
that these two lemmas do not require that the sign conditions for the production function
derivatives hold for all values of x, merely at the optimum. However, if the sign conditions
hold for all input values, then specific information about the optimum may not be required
to determine the type of an input (see example  below).
Comparing  Definitions  1 and  3,  note that when utility is of the exponential  or power
function  form,  and the  level of risk aversion  satisfies  the  appropriate  bound condition,
then a risk reducing/increasing input is also marginally risk reducing/increasing by Lemma
1. That is, the set of inputs which are risk reducing/increasing intersects the set of inputs
which are marginally  risk reducing/increasing  for a given production function.  In partic-
ular, Definition  2 and Definition  1 correspond  in Pope and Kramer's special case.
Sufficient  Conditions for Identifying  Risk Complements/Substitutes
Sufficient conditions  for identifying risk complements/substitutes  are more complex than
those above; prices are well as production function properties and bounds on risk aversion
determine the types of input pairs.
The coefficient  qi  shows the effect of one input on the marginal certainty equivalent for
the other input.  If qj > 0, then an increase in input i will increase the marginal certainty
equivalent for input j; if qi  < 0,  then the marginal certainty equivalent for inputj will be
reduced.  The general definition of qi,  obtained from the first order condition aCE*/dxi =
0, is:
qi  (1/u'(CE))  U'r*) xxj(X*,  0) +  uu'(r*)  )(,  dG().
[Xi  U  (Jr*)  (
A
One sufficient  condition to determine the type for a pair of inputs extends the classical
definitions of substitutes and complements based on the cross-product derivatives  of the
production function. The sign of qi  may be determined from the sign of:
[7rx(*,  0)  +  U'(  *)  *  0  (x*,  );
if this expression has a fixed sign, the sign of qij is the same as the sign of this term because
of monotone  utility. With risk aversion, a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for risk
substitutes (qi  < 0) is when inputs  are substitutes in the classical  production  sense (Fx.
< 0) for all values  of 0, and their marginal  profits have the same signs at the optimum.
Conversely,  a  sufficient  condition for inputs  to  be  risk complements  (qi  >  0)  is when
inputs are  complements  in the  classical  production  sense  (Fx,  > 0)  for all  values of 0,
and their marginal  profits have the opposite  sign at the optimum.  Note that prices play
a role in determining  the signs of marginal profits.
A weaker  sufficient condition for determining the sign of qi  for the exponential  utility
function is obtained  from Lehmann's  Theorem by considering the sign of the following
covariance  together with the  sign of Fxx  at the optimum:
Cov(rx*,  e-r(*+  W°))  - E(e-r(r*+  W)r**) - E(e-r(r*+  Wrxi)E(r*).
This covariance  is positive by Lehmann's  Theorem  (similar to the analysis  for risk in-
creasing/risk  reducing  inputs)  if  r*.o  is  positive  and  [7r*0 - rrx*rv*]  is  positive;  then
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E(e  r("1*+o)r*i*  is positive from  first order  conditions.  Conversely,  this covariance  is
negative  if signs  of these  terms are  opposite.  The lemma  below  summarizes  sufficient
conditions:
Lemma 4: For the exponential utility function  satisfying the bound condition  [rX0i  -
r7rr*] > 0: x, and xj are risk complements if F,  > 0 and  rx  < 0; x, and xj are risk
substitutes if Fxx  < 0 and  *x 0 > 0.
Note the above bound condition is based not only on physical properties of  the production
function  but also  on  relative  prices.  Similar  results  could  be  obtained  for  the  power
function.
Production Function Example
The following  example  illustrates  use of the above  definitions and lemmas.  The nature
of inputs is determined in part by physical relationships expressed in terms of production
function properties.
Suppose production  under risk is described by:
y = h(xi, x2)  + f(x 1 )0  +  X(1  +  g(x2))I(0),
where y is the crop yield, 0  represents rainfall, x, is fertilizer, and x2 is insecticide treatment.
1(0)  represents  insect  population  which increases  with rainfall.  X is a negative  number
showing that insects reduce yield. A positive value of I'(0) indicates that insect population
increases with good rainfall.  For g(x2) negative,  insecticide  treatment would  reduce the
negative effect of insects.  The derivative of y with respect to rainfall 0 should be positive
in some range  of xl and 0:
F0 =f(x,)  +  X(1  +  g(x,))I'(0) > 0.
Then, iff(x,) increases with xl, x,  will be a risk increasing input:
Fxo  =f'(xl) >  0.
For x2 to be a risk reducing input, g'(x2) should be positive to give:
Fx2  = Xg'(x2)'(0) < 0.
A sufficient condition for expected marginal  profit of fertilizer and insecticide to have
opposite  signs is that Fx 10 and Fx20 have opposite signs, e.g.,  iff'(x), g'(x2), and I'(0) are
positive  and  X is negative.  These  are  also the  same  conditions  for fertilizer to be  risk
increasing  and insecticide to be risk reducing!
Substitution/complementarity  for a pair of inputs relates to the sign of
a
2h
-xx  d=xldx 2'
which expresses  the effect of insecticide  on the marginal  product of fertilizer.  We  could
expect that insecticide would increase the expected marginal product of fertilizer, i.e., that
insecticide  and fertilizer potentially would be risk complements.  Risk complementarity
also requires that the signs of the marginal profits are opposite; i.e., if fertilizer is relatively
cheap compared to the value of its marginal product and pesticide is relatively expensive
compared  to the value of its marginal  product.
Case (vii) of the above theorem then applies.  If a risk averse person uses more fertilizer
than a risk neutral person, then also the risk averse person should use more insecticide;
the more risk averse person would then produce more output than the risk neutral person.
However, it is also possible that a risk averse person would use less of both fertilizer and
insecticide,  then  producing  less  output than  a risk neutral  person.  Or,  the risk averse
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person could use less  fertilizer and more insecticide than a risk neutral person with the
output effect not identifiable.
Conclusions
This article has generalized models of optimal input use in Pope and Kramer,  MacMinn
and Holtman, and Babcock, Chalfant, and Collender to apply for multiple inputs, a general
stochastic production  function, and both  exponential  and power utility functions.  Also,
our comparative  static results  expand results  obtained  by Pope and  Kramer.  Determi-
nation of input use  effects  of risk aversion  was  based on  a two-way  categorization  for
pairs of inputs-each input  separately as being risk increasing or decreasing and the pair
of inputs as being risk substitutes  or complements.
With production risk, unlike the price risk case in which a more risk averse firm produces
less output,  a more risk averse  firm  may produce  more expected  output and  use more
inputs than a risk neutral firm. Results in this article outline when this could occur and,
conversely,  when increased risk aversion would imply less output.
Properties  of the  stochastic production  function  were  relevant  to identify  alternative
input use  cases.  Production properties  describe  the physical interactions  of inputs with
explicit causes of risk. Production properties were sufficient to determine whether inputs
were  risk increasing  or  risk reducing.  However,  the nature  of sufficient  conditions  for
determining  risk  substitutes/complements  implies  that  production  function  properties
alone  are not sufficient to identify inputs  of these types.  Not surprisingly,  the results in
this article  show that not only production  function  properties but also the level of risk
aversion relative to income and relative prices determine how risk aversion should affect
risk management.
[Received October 1990; final revision received August 1992.]
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Appendix  A: Proof of Theorem
We will prove the result for one pair of inputs at the optimum.  For multiple inputs, each pair would be treated
similarly.  Inputs  are  denoted by the  indices  1 and 2.  (All  functions  are evaluated  at the  optimum but the *
notation is omitted.) Totally differentiating the first order conditions for i = 1, 2 with respect to the Pratt-Arrow
risk aversion  coefficient r in the exponential  case,
S  u'(ir)7r,  dG(O) = 0,
A
the following  simultaneous system is obtained:
dxl  dx 2 qll  dr + q
l
2  dr  -c,  and
dx,  dx 2
q 21  + q22 =  C 2, dr  dr
where
q  = qji = (/u'(CE))  f u'(r)rxj + u"(Tr)Trx,  dG(O),  and
A
ci = (l/u'(CE))drJ  u(r),rx, dG(.).
A
Note that qi  corresponds to the definition of risk substitutes/complements,  and ci corresponds to the definition
of risk increasing/decreasing  inputs.  Solving the above system, we  obtain
r = det  - C  q12
dr - et  q22/ IDI =(-cq 22 + c 2)IDI,  and
dr  L c2 q 2 2jc
dr 
det[2  '2  /  ID  = (-c 2qll  + Clql2)IDI,
where
DI  =  det[
q "  Iq2].
[q 21 q22j
Second  order sufficient conditions for a pair of inputs are that:  q,  <  0, q2 2 < 0,  and D = qlq 2 2 - q22 > 0.
dxi  dx<
For the one input case or the case of no substitution  with q12 =  0,  =  -ci/q,; thus, ci <  0 implies  d  <  0,
dr  dr
and the reverse  sign for ci > 0.
In the six  cases  for ql2 # 0, there are eight possible  sign combinations for  q 12, cl, c2, as shown  in appendix
table Al; these eight cases  reduce to the six  cases of the theorem  as indicated.  Table Al shows four cases (El,
dx, E2,  E3, and  E4) for  sign combinations  of d-  Note  that E3  corresponds  to a  decrease  in  expected  output
dr
and  E4 gives  an  increase  in  expected output;  El and  E2  produce  indeterminate  output  effects.  For  these
combinations,  "S"  denotes sufficient  conditions, "NP"  corresponds  to cases  which are not possible,  and "P"
indicates possible cases.
The S,  P,  and NP results  are obtained from  - and second  order conditions.  For the  sufficient  (S) cases,
dr
dx,
the signs  of  d  are  determined  directly  by the stated  conditions and  second  order conditions.  As  an exam-
dr
ple  of a  sufficient  (S)  case,  if q,2 < 0,  c,  < 0,  and  c 2 >  0,  then - < 0  and - >  0  are  obtained directly
dr  dr
dx.
from the expressions  for  -.  When there is a sufficient condition in a row of table Al, the other cases in the
dr
row are not possible (NP).
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Table Al.  Sign Combinations
Combination  Input Sign Cases  T Theorem
ql2  Ci  c2  El  E2  E3  E4  Case
+  - - NP  NP  S  NP  (v)
+  - +  NP  P  P  P  (vii)
+  +  +  - P  NP  P  P  (vii)
+  +  +  NP  NP  NP  S  (vi)
P  P  P  NP  (ii)
- - +  NP  S  NP  NP  (iv)
+  S  NP  NP  NP  (iv)
+  +  P  P  NP  P  (iii)
Notation:
El: dxl/dr > 0, dx2/dr < 0.
E2: dxl/dr < 0,  dx2/dr > 0.
E3: dxl/dr < 0,  dx2/dr < 0.
E4: dxl/dr > 0,  dx2/dr > 0.
For cases  (ii), (iii), and (vii) of the theorem,  proofs of the not possible (NP) cases  are obtained  from second
order conditions.
dxl
Case (ii):  Suppose  ql2  <  0, c 2 < 0,  and -'  >  0. Then dr
Clq22 <  c2q2.
From second order conditions,
cql2q22  >  c 2q22  >  c 2qlq22.
So,  since  q22  < 0,
Clq,2  <  c 2ql
dX2  dX2 implies  - <  0; thus,  >  0 is  not possible.
dr  dr
dx, Case (iii):  Suppose ql2 <  0, c 2 > 0, and - <  0. Then dr
clq22  >  c 2 q12;
also,
clq22q,2 <  c2q22  <  c2qllq22.
This implies (since  q22  < 0)
Clql2 >  C 2 qll,
dx2 dx,
or  - >  0. Thus,  < 0 is not possible. dr  dr
dX,
Case (vii):  Suppose q, 2 >  0, c 2 >  0, and - >  0. Then dr
Clq22  <  c 2q12.
From second order conditions,
clq2q22  < c2q22 <  c2qllq22
Since q22  < 0,
Clql2  > C 2qll
dXi  dx2 implies  - >  0. Thus, - < 0 is not possible.
dxi
Possible  (P) outcomes  occur  when the numerator  for  - contains  terms  of opposite  sign;  then signs depend
on the relative sizes of c,, C2,  q2, q 22, and ql,. For example, when  ql2 < 0 and c, and c2 have the same sign, terms
dx, in the numerator of  have opposite  signs. The proof for the power function is similar because of a positive
dr
relationship  between s and r. QED.
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Appendix  B: Summary of Lehmann's Theorem (from  Barlow and Proschan) and
Application  to Production Under Risk
Definition of Quadrant  Dependence
Given  a pair (U,  V)  of random variables  with a joint distribution,  the pair is positively quadrant dependent  if
P(U -<  u,  V <  v) > P(U < u)P(V  < v)  for all u,  v,
and negatively quadrant dependent  if the reverse inequality holds.
Lehmann's Theorems
The following is a special case of Lehmann's Theorem  1:
Theorem 1: Let  U,  Vbe positively quadrant dependent and r(U), s(V) be monotone transformations of U,
V.  Then the pair (r(U), s(V)) is positively quadrant dependent if r and s are monotone in the same direction
and negatively  quadrant dependent if r and s are monotone in opposite  directions.
The following is a restatement  of Lehmann's Theorem  2:
Theorem 2: If (U,  V)  are positively  quadrant dependent,  then E(UV)  >  E(U)E(V); the reverse holds for
negative quadrant dependence. Let r(U), s(V) be monotone transformations  of U,  V. Then, if r and s are
monotone in the same direction,
E(r(U) s(V))  > E(r(U)) E(s(V)),
and if r and s are monotone in the opposite directions,  then
E(r(U) s(V))  < E(r(U)) E(s(V)).
Application of Lehmann's Theorems for Production Under Risk
We apply the above theorems  in this article by
(a)  taking  U =  V = 0 [then  (0, 0)  is positively quadrant dependent]  and
(b)  considering F(x,  0),  Fx(x, 0),  u'(pF(x,  ) - wx)  to be transformations  of 0.
The following results  are obtained by direct application  of the above theorems:
(a)  Fo,  Fxo have the same sign implies Cov(F, Fx)  > 0;
(b)  Fo, FxO have opposite  signs implies Cov(F, Fx)  < 0;
(c)  u"Fo, Fxo have the same sign implies Cov(u',  Fx)  > 0; for u" <  0, this is when Fo and Fxo  have opposite
signs;
(d)  u"F0, Fxo have opposite signs implies Cov(u',  Fx) <  0; for u" <  0, this is when Fo and Fxo have the same
sign.
Even if Fo and Fxo are not monotone,  the following weaker results are obtained since u' (.) and its inverse (u')-
are monotone transformations when u'(.) is strictly decreasing:
(e)  If (F, Fx) is positively quadrant dependent and if u is strictly concave, then (u', Fx) is negatively  quadrant
dependent and Cov(u',  Fx)  < 0. The reverse holds if (F,  Fx) is negatively  quadrant dependent.
(f)  If (u', Fx) is positively  quadrant  dependent  [so that Cov(u',  Fx) > 0]  and  u(.)  is strictly concave,  then
Cov(F,  Fx) <  0; the reverse holds if (u', Fx) is negatively  quadrant dependent.
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